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## **Religion and State in More's *Utopia*: Challenging Republicanism<sup>1</sup> and the Byzantine *synallelia*, *symfonia* and *harmonia***

*Abstract:* After examining republican vs. non-republican interpretations of Moore's work, I focus on an interpretation inspired by Augustine. I close with some improvements on this Augustinian model of Church-State relations provided by Byzantine Emperors and Patriarchs. I propose that the Byzantine improvements provide a more stable and less problematic model.

*Keywords:* Moore, Augustine, Justinian, Photius, Leo III, *synallelia*, *symfonia*, *harmonia*

In what follows, I shall discuss the issue of the most appropriate interpretation of the treatment of religion and religious life in More's *Utopia*. I shall focus on the republican interpretation provided by Stevens as well as some non-republican interpretations of More's work. My preferred interpretation however, shall provide an analysis based on Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, trying to establish an ideological origin of More's solution to the problem of religious toleration and the relation of religion to the State. I will close my work with a brief discussion of the parallel developments in Byzantine Empire and how some key philosophers and theologians there improved on the Augustinian ideas. I shall not pay particular attention to the philological aspects of the arguments in Moore's work nor the stylistic analysis of the relevant passages in the *Utopia*; my investigation concerns mainly the actual arguments involved and all my stylistic and philological interest into the work will be directed towards elucidating the relevant issues in the discussed arguments.

### **1. Stevens' Interpretation of *Utopia*: More's State Religion**

Stevens' main argument is that what More's *Utopia* teaches all republican and liberal theorists is that, even in the case where you have absolute religious toleration and the Church is completely divided from the State in all its functions, you nevertheless must have a religious component in the ideology and theory of the State, if you are to have

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<sup>1</sup> The paper discusses Republicanism, as the philosophical sense of this term is supported by mainly American theorists. In this perspective, people have unalienable rights and freedoms that cannot be voted away by a majority of voters (as it happens in the case of a Democracy, where everything -including laws and fundamental rights- is decided by the majority); it is a protection of liberties based on a rule of law rooted in constitutional laws that are regarded more or less as inviolable (see Pettit 1997; Pettit 2012; Rahe 1992; Viroli 2002; Skinner 2008).

the stability and order that is necessary for conducting efficiently State business and maintaining order and longevity. This component consists mainly in the piety that the citizens of the republican and liberal utopia must have towards the magistrate and the other state functions and representatives of government.<sup>2</sup> This piety is so important for republican State longevity, that the State must restrain religious belief and control all aspects of religious belief and practice via a specially selected and state controlled body of officials, whose main duty is the safeguard of State (approved and supported) religion. Let us look at Stevens' argument in more detail.

Stevens finds that More's Utopia is 'emphatically' republican in character: the Utopia is a state with laws and the 'rule of law' in this state prevails; the laws are administered by a hierarchy of officials, who have 'great discretion' and they are elected.<sup>3</sup> In this way, More's Utopia is presented as a step towards the restoration of the ancient republican institutions in the West (after the long absence of republicanism during the Middle Ages).

However, Stevens finds that More's vision of the restoration of republicanism is of a modern character. There is a radical difference between the visions of ancient and of modern republics (such as the one portrayed by More's *Utopia*) and this is that modern republics are 'liberal' republics, in the sense that they aim to preserve and protect what modern political theory considers as pre-political liberties from governmental or state interference.<sup>4</sup> This governmental or state power is limited by a constitution and is based on a conception of citizenship in which all citizens are equal, in a much truer sense than in the ancient republics. The true *res publica* (which is what More's *Utopia* is aiming for, according to Stevens) is based on an egalitarianism that abolishes permanent and inheritable rank and allows all citizens to participate equally in the running of the State business. In such all inclusive citizenship and participation, it differs greatly from the ancient republics, where citizenship and participation are not distributed equally and are not all inclusive.<sup>5</sup>

There is however, one more radical difference between the two forms of republican government, which makes More's Utopia more of a modern rather than an ancient form, according to Stevens: the modern republics try to establish a compromise between the religion of Christianity and republican state ideology.<sup>6</sup> The ancient forms of republican theory were not in need of such a compromise, since Christianity had not yet emerged and ancient forms of religion were political, in the sense that each *polis* had a religion, and the magistrate as well as the rule of law protected this religion (even with the penalty of death, as is evident in the example of Socrates), 'resolving the tension' in this way between magistrates and priests. What is different with the coming of Christianity is the trans-political and orthodox character of the Christian religion; the republican theory now had to deal with a universal form of religion that placed a 'trans-political' orthodoxy over and above the boundaries of political power.<sup>7</sup> According to Stevens,

<sup>2</sup> Stevens 1969, pp. 387-8.

<sup>3</sup> Stevens 1969, p. 388.

<sup>4</sup> Stevens 1969, pp. 388-9.

<sup>5</sup> Stevens 1969, pp. 390-391.

<sup>6</sup> Even though, as he acknowledges, More is not such an exemplary modern republican theorist as Machiavelli is; for more on this issue see Stevens 1969, p. 392.

<sup>7</sup> Stevens 1969, p. 394.

More with his *Utopia* proposed his solution to the emerging problem of recovering full-blooded republicanism in a predominantly Christian world. When seen in this light, the very issue of More's Christian beliefs (for Stevens) becomes irrelevant<sup>8</sup> and More's efforts can fit in quite well with the rest of Renaissance and modern republican thought. Thus, in the long tradition of Renaissance republican theorists, More becomes a key figure: like Dante and Machiavelli, he tried to limit papal state authority; however, unlike Dante and Machiavelli, More tried to find a genuine solution, in which the Church dogma and authority not only is limited, but becomes irrelevant and unimportant for state business.<sup>9</sup> This is quite evident in the role of priesthood in More's *Utopia*: the priests are preserved, but now they serve the function of teaching morally about citizenship and public virtue, supporting a minimal doctrine of natural theology, while at the same time totally subordinating religion to the country and the common religious life. The co-existence of absolute toleration, different privately held religious viewpoints and a priesthood that is totally subordinated to the state, formulate the conditions for the emergence of a new public theology, where theological disputes become unimportant and doctrinal and liturgical differences irrelevant. Christianity in this way is allowed to exist, because it is 'only "near" to the reasonable religion prevalent in *Utopia*.'<sup>10</sup> This new public theology remains content to acknowledge general ignorance about divine things and thus that, as far as religion is concerned, 'everything goes': natural theology here cannot prove nor support a specific dogma; it is only a means for providing further support to absolute toleration and the lack of conclusive rational arguments in supporting one against the religion of another.<sup>11</sup>

This emphasis on the peripheral role of Christianity for the description of the best state of commonwealth (which is More's *Utopia*) is supported, according to Stevens, by four particular issues related to More's discussion of *Utopia*: firstly, when Raphael (the main character of *Utopia* and the first hand source for the Utopian commonwealth) embarks on a fourth voyage to *Utopia* (which could be his last one, deciding to remain there rather than to return), he decides to take with him books of classical learning, but no Christian books. This issue is rather problematic: More had a habit of mentioning literary achievements contemporary to him and he could rather easily mention here his friend Erasmus' recent accomplishment in translating the New Testament (in 1516), by adding this book to Raphael's list.<sup>12</sup> Since More made no mention of his friend's accomplishment, this means (for Stevens) that More wanted to avoid paying undue notice to the role of religion in the development of Raphael's intellectual constitution. Secondly, *Utopia*'s best state of commonwealth was established by Utopus in about 245 BC, a fictional date, when it would have been impossible for *Utopia* to incorporate Christian elements into the first constitution of the Commonwealth.<sup>13</sup> Thirdly, no mention of the coming of Christianity, nor of the influence of Christianity on the constitution of Uto-

<sup>8</sup> Stevens 1969, p. 395.

<sup>9</sup> Stevens 1969, pp. 396-398.

<sup>10</sup> Stevens 1969, p. 400.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Stevens 1969, pp. 402-3.

<sup>13</sup> Stevens 1969, p. 403.

pia is ever made in a specific way, emphasising in this way the peripheral role of the introduction of Christianity to Utopian society.<sup>14</sup> Fourthly, in the foundation of the 'best state of commonwealth', Utopus ruled that each Utopian could follow the religion of his choice and that he could try to persuade others and bring them to his religion by reasons, but such a persuasion should not use violence or abuse, with the penalty of exile or enslavement. This fourth element (for Stevens) is the most indicative of the way that More envisaged the relation between religion and state ideology should develop. Beyond the obvious political reason for sanctioning absolute religious toleration (so that conflicts due to religious differences become extinct and peace be secured) Utopus, according to Stevens' interpretation, was absolute about the sanctioning of religious toleration, for a religious reason as well: he believed in religious truth and he hoped that in this way truth about God will eventually shine.<sup>15</sup>

Stevens, in discussing the positive side of the common religion of the Utopians, colours in more detail the 'truth' of this religion: God is good, but unknowable, there is a system of rewards after death and the souls of the dead safeguard the benefits of public and moral shame. And though the Utopians despise divinations, they believe in and pray for miracles even in matters of state importance.<sup>16</sup> The priesthood, which serves the primary function of protecting the public religion and inspiring awe at places of worship, is elected by the citizens and supervises worship, religious rites and the moral uprightness in the citizen's lives, as well as the education of children. The priesthood is supported by magistrates, who can punish with exile persistent moral offenders deemed worthy of excommunication. The priests do not receive confession and their role in the Utopian society is far from mystical. They perform, according to Stevens, the role of 'public school teachers who inculcate salutary opinions and form character' through 'the authority of God and the fear of hell'.<sup>17</sup> The Credo of this religion performs an equally political service: in it the citizens thank God for living in such a happy commonwealth and believe in a religion that they hope to be the truest. In this public religion to be a good man means essentially to be a good citizen in the commonwealth; and in this way the harmonious co-existence of all religions is guaranteed 'because the public religion has about as much substantive religious content as a New York public school prayer composed by a committee which included the Pope, Mao, Nietzsche, a Jehovah's Witness and Mr. Justice Douglas'.<sup>18</sup>

More's public religion then, for Stevens, has a dual character as relates to its truth: the 'true' religion is a matter for private sect theology, and the other character of religion 'which is only incidentally related to religion' is the responsibility of a body of 'public officers who are merely *called* priests' and consists in the formation of the citizen's character and in supporting patriotism and domestic peace.<sup>19</sup>

Of course there is an evident question here as regards the reason for the name of this body of public officers (i.e., 'priests') and Stevens attempts to reply by providing two

<sup>14</sup> Stevens 1969, pp.403-4.

<sup>15</sup> Stevens 1969, p.406.

<sup>16</sup> Stevens 1969, pp.405-6.

<sup>17</sup> Stevens 1969, p.407.

<sup>18</sup> Stevens 1969, p.408.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.



reasons: a positive and a negative one. The positive consists in the acknowledgement by Stevens that Kant's 'bloodless and cold' rationality of the universal rule of law is not sufficient to 'animate the public acts of a race of men with a publicly salutary spirit'.<sup>20</sup> More, according to Stevens, saw that Utopia's republican structural characteristics of absolute freedom and equality meant that the people could even choose their own unfreedom and inequality and thus, a republican self-annihilation, if not prevented by a constitutional control mechanism. Such a mechanism, for Stevens, can only be provided through philosophy and religion. And because philosophy for More (in true humanistic spirit, according to Stevens) is not a matter for the masses, religion or at least a religious related mechanism could serve such a function.<sup>21</sup> Actually, Stevens here finds a similarity to Machiavelli who recommends that the prince does not need to be religious, but he does need to appear religious to function effectively as a prince, and he cites Raphael's observation that fear of God is 'almost' the only stimulus to virtue.<sup>22</sup> This then for Stevens is the only positive reason for the lack of any complete division of the State from the Church in More's Utopia and the use of the name of 'priests' for the body of these public officials.

There is however, a negative reason as well; the negative reason consists in the State's desire to keep the peace amongst the citizens, who may have different private religions and varying degrees of faith. As such, it has to have a constitutional *modus vivendi*, i.e., a description of what is and what is not tolerable, as well as a body of public officials with exclusive jurisdiction over these matters.<sup>23</sup> In this way, according to Stevens, when there is a 'cult of murderers' who see that it is their divinely sanctioned duty to kill all unbelievers, it is the duty of the republican state officials to intervene and curtail their influence and power right from the start. In abridging the freedom of this group of citizens the country does not renounce its republican character, but only exercises its right to interfere where the future of the commonwealth is at risk.<sup>24</sup> This constitutional *modus vivendi* not only controls the freedoms of potentially dangerous cults, but also exercises control over who can join the body of public officials responsible for the safeguarding of this public religion. Thus, only those who 'think' that there is God and divine providence and that there is life after death can join this body, and this for Stevens is quite compatible with a republican vision of a commonwealth.<sup>25</sup> According to the interpretation Stevens suggests, religion in Utopia (as well as in any republic) is defined and constituted by public decision and this decision is what delineates the public from the private realm.<sup>26</sup>

Stevens finds that the Utopian religious *modus vivendi* provides quite an adequate solution to a characteristically republican political problem: religious rights, their scope and the freedoms they require in a republican state are a test case for the modern doctrine of rights. These rights, even though pre-political and absolute, are constantly under threat by the interference of the state; as such, any limitation on

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Stevens 1969, p.410.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Stevens is citing here the work of Cropsey 1960; see Stevens 1969, p. 410, footnote 32.

<sup>26</sup> Stevens 1969, p.410.

state interference can only be decided by constantly referring the arising problems and rectifying the behaviour of the state officials back to the pre-modern view of the republic 'out of which it arose but from which it is a departure'.<sup>27</sup>

## 2. Engeman's and Logan's Interpretation.

Stevens' interpretation is trying to make sense of the *Utopia* as a work in isolation from both its writer's preferred ideology and its intended philosophical and literary result. This interpretation allows Stevens to claim that More's theological convictions play no important role in the political interpretation of the work. It is not however without opposition. Both Engeman's and Logan's study of the work try a different route. Both see the work together with the writer's ideological viewpoint and literary intention. Let us start with Engeman's interpretation.

Engeman notes from the start that the "correct" interpretation of More's *Utopia* is no easy task. He acknowledges the fact that the work has been seen both as a continuation of ideologies about the best state of commonwealth arising from Plato's *Republic*, and as introducing a modern agenda of questions and answers to old problems.<sup>28</sup>

Engeman sees *Utopia* as a philosophical dialogue, the main purpose of which is to portray the pitfalls and wisdom of the main character's political and philosophical ideology. Through Raphael's dialogues and monologues we see more clearly the vision for the best commonwealth upon which More tried to exercise a critique and from which he tried to distance himself. Raphael, the main character of the work, is neither an intelligent nor a credible witness for his Utopian vision; and More's attempt to portray Raphael's ideas is an attempt to show that all similar visions meet with the same ideological problems that face Raphael's viewpoint: 'The Utopia, then, is not a philosophic treatise in which More speaks through the character of [Raphael] Hythloday; it is the best commonwealth conceived by someone like Hythloday'.<sup>29</sup> Engelman notes that in More's eyes Raphael was neither a genuine philosopher nor a god, but looked like a 'ship's captain': he was immoderate in his passions and opinions and lacked consideration for others. Engeman finds that Raphael's lack of consideration for others (which he finds throughout the work) makes him characteristically non-political: a necessary ingredient of life in a community is to care and think about others' opinions; Raphael thus, is dysfunctional both socially and politically.<sup>30</sup>

More's political viewpoint is portrayed in the work as completely different than that of Raphael: the first shows a profound respect for the laws and opinions of his fellow citizens, placed clearly in the political context of his time (More is 'Renowned' and 'Citizen and Sheriff of the Famous City of Great Britain, London'), while Hythloday by his very name portrays a 'purveyor of nonsense' and a citizen of no country, an a-political character of a non-existent and unrealistic country of nowhere.<sup>31</sup> Their difference becomes even greater when one looks at their way of engaging with the ideas present-

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Engeman 1982, pp.131-2.

<sup>29</sup> Engeman 1982, p.134.

<sup>30</sup> Engeman 1982, pp. 134-5, footnote 6.

<sup>31</sup> Engeman 1982, p.135, footnote 7.

ed. Raphael is depicted as lacking any sense of philosophical temper, unable to argue dialectically with the presented ideas, being self-certain and operating on the level of opinion, which in his warped understanding of Plato's *Republic* seems to him wisdom itself.<sup>32</sup> His aim is to transcend the level of ordinary politics, seeking political salvation in the establishment of new and more just political principles that are superior to both the speculative philosophy of Plato and the revealed teachings of Christianity.<sup>33</sup> The citizens of Utopia are without sin and have no unfulfilled desires, nor do they doubt the legitimacy of their system: they are self-righteous and morally numb. This is most evident in their relation to the Zapoletes; their favorite mercenaries are a sub-race and their death a mere 'fiscally conservative policy'.<sup>34</sup>

In this way, the Utopian attitude towards religion (and in particular Christianity) becomes rather absurd: even though dogmatic Christianity is regarded irrational and is ousted from the official and public life (because it destroys the Utopian sense of individual happiness through the emphasis on asceticism and it allows for religious controversy and conflict)<sup>35</sup>, the existence in Utopia of a group of religious ascetics called 'Buthresque' runs counter to this attitude towards Christianity leaving such a discrepancy unexplained. Engeman notes that the Utopians consider the 'Buthresque' holy, but irrational or insane, because they put themselves in the position of slaves carrying out the 'rough, hard and filthy' tasks that more rational Utopians consider necessary, but would never dare to engage in. In addition, Engeman cites the equally absurd Utopian belief that the soul should be considered immortal not because of theological revelation, but on the basis of utilitarian considerations and for the avoidance of base pleasures.<sup>36</sup> This rather self-contradictory view of religion becomes coherent only through an Epicurean political and quasi-religious viewpoint. However, Raphael's poor appropriation of Epicureanism is not without contradictions and philosophical problems. Raphael, being himself a character with no philosophical ambition nor inclination, portrays an Epicureanism quite vulgar and unacceptable to a consistent Epicurean: while citizens of Utopia are allowed to pursue mental pleasures, the discussion of natural pleasure is dedicated only to the praise of bodily health as an absence of pain and as a main source of pleasure.<sup>37</sup> At the same time, there is no serious discussion of freedom (both in the metaphysical and in the moral sense), an issue of great importance for all consistent Epicureans.<sup>38</sup>

Engeman next considers the problematic and self-contradictory role of priests in Utopian society. They are priests, but also rulers and teachers, administrators and magistrates. They are beyond the law that they enforce and they are the most powerful citi-

<sup>32</sup> Engeman 1982, pp.136-7.

<sup>33</sup> Engeman 1982, pp. 137-8.

<sup>34</sup> Engeman 1982, pp.138-9.

<sup>35</sup> Engeman 1982, pp.141-2.

<sup>36</sup> Engeman 1982, p.142.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. Here one could also criticise Raphael's poor appropriation of Epicureanism on the grounds that the idea of a universal brotherhood of man (characteristic of all mainstream Epicureanism) is deemed unnecessary and impractical by the commonwealth, since it divides human beings into rational and not, and considers the less rational as subhuman (see the above discussion of the Utopians' treatment of the Zapoletes). Engeman, however, does not discuss this issue.

<sup>38</sup> Engeman 1982, p.143.

zens in a commonwealth that strives to eliminate political differences via lack of private property.<sup>39</sup> While their role is one of enforcing a spirit of rationalization and demystification of religious doctrines, and of trying to protect the public life from private religious beliefs, they also serve as intermediaries with the gods, asking them for help in times of need and wearing garments that 'have a symbolic, apparently mysterious message'.<sup>40</sup> This rather philosophically and politically burlesque account of Raphael's vision for the 'best state of commonwealth' serves for Engeman a dual purpose: in writing the *Utopia* More tried not only to defend 'the medieval English polity', but also 'for the increasingly numerous and influential followers of Hythloday, who escaped his strict law enforcement, and whose political passions limited their perception of his irony [...], More showed an understanding of their new utopian ideals sufficient for them to believe in both his prescience and friendship'.<sup>41</sup>

Logan's approach to the *Utopia* is more holistic than either Stevens' or Engeman's. Unlike Stevens, he sees the work within its broad literary, political and ideological context, associating it both to its author's aspirations and intentions as well as the political milieu of its time; however, his interpretation differs from Engeman's, in that it denies the strict Christian Humanistic role that Engeman's allows.<sup>42</sup>

In his study, Logan reviews the major trends in the interpretation of *Utopia*, citing among many others the view of Hexter, who thought that 'More truly believed that the Utopian commonwealth as he had framed it was the Best Society',<sup>43</sup> as well as the view of C. S. Lewis, who places *Utopia* 'not in the history of political thought so much as in that of fiction and satire', considering it more or less a *jeu d'esprit*.<sup>44</sup> He concludes that, even though the work is one of political theory, it is of a very peculiarly complex and multifaceted kind: 'The mode of this work of political theory, then, is not merely fiction but self-mocking fiction'.<sup>45</sup> Logan's own preferred interpretation sees *Utopia* as a work within the Renaissance Humanistic tradition, but not following the Erasmian Christian Humanistic standards. He places the Renaissance Humanistic work of More in opposition to the idealism of Christian Humanists, because it deals with the real problems of social structure and tries to eliminate these problems via legal and institutional reform, while acknowledging that this cannot take place without sacrificing the freedoms of the citizens, and treating non-citizens with injustice.<sup>46</sup> But he also sees More's work as a critique on the *realpolitisch* of the secular Humanism of his time, in that it highlights the problems caused by the Machiavellian independence of politics from morality: politics without morality is as inexpedient as morality without politics.<sup>47</sup> Logan however, not

<sup>39</sup> Engeman 1982, pp. 143-4.

<sup>40</sup> Engeman 1982, p.145.

<sup>41</sup> Engeman 1982, p.148.

<sup>42</sup> Logan, 1983, pp.ix-x.

<sup>43</sup> Hexter 1952, p.57, as cited in Logan 1983, p.5.

<sup>44</sup> Lewis 1954, p.167, as cited in Logan 1983, p.5.

<sup>45</sup> Logan 1983, p.30.

<sup>46</sup> Logan 1983, pp.254-8.

<sup>47</sup> Logan 1983, pp.258-9.



only places More's work in its ideological past and present; he also views it as having elements of modernity, both in the solutions that it provides to social problems of his time, and in the controlled experimental use of imaginative models of social relations.<sup>48</sup> In short, Logan's interpretation considers most of the main available interpretations in More's work and, as such, it will be interesting to see the way that it portrays the relation of religion and the state.

Logan notes in a very interesting footnote<sup>49</sup> that More's view on the relation of revelation to reason was not only received common ground from the Christian philosophers and theologians of Medieval Europe (the Thomistic relation of Philosophy to Theology as well as the Lateran Council resolutions of 1513 being just results of this common ground), but was also accepted by noted Renaissance Humanists such as Ficino and Pico. So, it was not More's intention to present a new way of addressing this point.

The relation of revelation to reason as presented in *Utopia*, according to Logan, can only be fully comprehended as part of More's dual aim in presenting his ideas in the form of a fictional model for political life: a model, because he (More) thought that this is a methodological advance on the social analysis of his time; fictional, because in this way its appeal and hence utility is greatly enhanced.<sup>50</sup> The key to understanding this relation, according to Logan, lies in the Epicurean moral philosophy of the Utopians, the exposition of which comes right before the discussion of the Utopian religion in the second book of the work.<sup>51</sup> Having this perspective in mind, political and moral rationalism aims to what is pleasant by nature.<sup>52</sup> However, the Utopians also see that this will lead some (if not all) to utter sensualism and futile hedonism. A best state of commonwealth cannot be maintained for long, if all the citizens act on the basis of their pleasures. Thus, being rationalists, they see that the life of virtue cannot be rationally justified unless one accepts the existence of God and immortality of the soul.<sup>53</sup> So, if they want their fellow citizens to benefit most from the two 'most valuable ancient philosophies of the good', Epicureanism and Stoicism, then they have to adopt the accepted Christian religious doctrines of the existence of God and the immortality of soul as part of their political *modus vivendi*.<sup>54</sup> This political and moral attitude towards religion makes More's theory here a forerunner of the rationalism and utilitarianism of J. S. Mill, who also thought that belief in Christianity was quite compatible with the belief in pleasure as the final good and the qualified hedonistic calculus.<sup>55</sup> So, according to Logan, the apparent contradiction between reason and Utopian religion becomes less contradictory, if we see the prudential underpinning of the Utopian religion.<sup>56</sup> Logan here follows Duhamel, in claiming that a parallel reading of Aquinas helps us understand

<sup>48</sup> Logan 1983, p.359.

<sup>49</sup> Logan 1983, p.141, footnote 10.

<sup>50</sup> Logan 1983, p.142.

<sup>51</sup> Logan 1983, pp.143-8.

<sup>52</sup> Logan 1983, p.149.

<sup>53</sup> Logan 1983, pp.160-1.

<sup>54</sup> Logan 1983, pp.160-2.

<sup>55</sup> Logan 1983, pp.180-1.

<sup>56</sup> Logan 1983, pp.218-9.

More's conviction that 'on theological questions reason can arrive at only probable conclusions'.<sup>57</sup> The acceptance of Christianity by the Utopians thus, can be easily understood, once we realize that More here, according to Logan, is just following Pico in believing that religion is a fulfilment of philosophy in achieving the ultimate end.<sup>58</sup> This, however, More does while directing our attention to the fact that there are difficulties in Raphael's account of the best commonwealth that both secular rationalist humanists and Christian humanists would do well to take into consideration. Thus, the achievement of the goals of the 'best state of commonwealth' –freedom and equality, security and charity- make Utopia an impossible state to exist and function in both its internal and its external policies.<sup>59</sup> To be rational in these policies means that it is not possible to be Christian and to be Christian means that it is impossible to be rational. This political naiveté of both Christian and secular humanists was the real target of the self-mocking Utopia and all the contradictions that exist in the work can only be explained according to Logan in this way.<sup>60</sup>

It is worthwhile at this point in our investigation to see what Engeman's and Logan's interpretations offer us in relation to Stevens' republican interpretation of the Utopian relation of state and religion. First, as can be shown quite clearly from Engeman's work, More's *Utopia* cannot be placed easily within the republican school of thought. More and his main character, Raphael, are so distinct and opposite in mentality, temperament and ideological conviction that it is clear they express opposite sides in the problems presented in *Utopia*. This is not only supported by Logan in his interpretation, but the additional element of the style of political theory expressed in the work, as being a self-mocking fictional model (which is quite adequately represented in Logan's exegesis), makes it even more difficult to see any association to modern republicanism. Logan's elaboration on More's attack on the *realpolitisch* of his ideological opponents makes this quite clear: More attacked Raphael's republicanism, with its emphasis on equality, democratic processes, common public rationality and the (poorly appropriated by Raphael) Epicureanism of Renaissance Humanism. More saw that these elements of Raphael's republicanism (when they are the sole determining factors in guiding internal and external policy) present to us a political theory that cannot be without serious internal contradictions and is thus non-rational, quite contrary to republican belief. Moreover, it allows for the political, emotional and intellectual stagnation and the alienation of the citizens from their own humanity, as presented in the treatment of the ascetics and the sub-human Zapoletes. More, even though not a Renaissance Christian Humanist in the style of Erasmus, was nevertheless a devoted Christian thinker till the end of his life, and he saw Christianity as the exclusive basis of morality and public life.<sup>61</sup> However, we

<sup>57</sup> Duhamel 1955, p.242, in Logan 1983, p.220).

<sup>58</sup> Logan in his interpretation on Pico here follows Kristeller 1964, p.69, as in Logan 1983, p.220, footnote 82).

<sup>59</sup> Logan 1983, p.244.

<sup>60</sup> Logan 1983, pp.249-253.

<sup>61</sup> Both his death and his strong ideological opposition to state interference and control of the Church through out his life testify to this conviction; see here More's last work (*The Dialogue of Comfort*, 1534), which More wrote while awaiting death because he did not recognise King Henry VIII as the head of the

can easily see through Logan's interpretation that More had neither a Thomistic nor a Christian Humanist vision as the ideological basis of the political theory that he saw as best. What then can we say about his ideological foundations? If More is not a republican theorist, nor a Christian Humanist, nor a Thomist, what is he? One possible answer to this question may lie in More's early pre-occupation with Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*.<sup>62</sup>

### 3. More and Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*.

It is necessary to note from the beginning that Augustine's chief political work (the *De Civitate Dei*) is trying to bring together two quite contradictory aims: on the one hand, to convince those with knowledge of the ancient Greek political ideals that living in a community of men is not going to bring them happiness; on the other hand, to convince Christians that, during their earthly existence and in their pursuit of the eternal happiness, which is their salvation in the grace of God, they cannot but live in a community of men. These two rather contradictory aims that could be rephrased as the attempt to unite political idealism (in the belief of a divinely constituted and transcendent *polis*) with political realism (which can be seen as the acceptance of the shortcomings of existent political realities) make the Christians' life in the community of men seem irrational and futile. The Christian is living a political life which he/she knows is doomed to failure, chaos and disaster, if not guided by what is not political: the will of God. Moreover, the thesis that the political wisdom of the past, communal will and the rationality of laws, customs and institutions cannot bring happiness and justice in the *polis* is an anathema and blasphemy to all with trust and hope in politics. It was however, what Augustine tried to prove and show with his work.

In this way, we can see that Augustine and Raphael (the hero of *Utopia*) are quite opposite to each other both on ideological and on methodological grounds: Augustine was a trained and able philosopher arguing that the philosophical pursuit of wisdom and truth can lead to a political bond of rational beings pursuing the true political principles of justice and love;<sup>63</sup> Raphael was no philosopher and in his Utopia philosophy had no role in the political or intellectual development of the commonwealth; also, justice had a material direction in the form of communal property and equality of political rights, with total disregard for love as a politically oriented feeling (in the Christian or even the Aristotelian sense). In Augustine's vision, the lawgivers and the magistrate must study (philosophically and theologically) the nature of man as created by an Omnipotent, Omniscient and Benevolent God and must transform the law and customs of the community of men, so that they obey the divine law, since only in this way the community of men

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Church, and in which he elaborates on his conviction that all the goods of this world, both mental and physical, are not worth the loss of eternal life and the alienation from God. See also Karl Kautsky 1959, esp. Chapter III: More and Catholicism, pp.104-114, and Anthony Kenny 1993, esp. his discussion of More's *A Dialogue concerning Heresies*, pp.252-259.

<sup>62</sup> Kenny 1993, p. 214.

<sup>63</sup> See *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIX, Chapter 24: "A people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement about the objects of their love". See also Book IV: "And so justice removed, what are the kingdoms but great robber bands? And what are robber bands but small kingdoms?"



will achieve peace and its political aims of universal justice and love.<sup>64</sup> In Raphael's vision, the lawgivers and magistrates study current and past political institutions and mores and decide which is best for the community, trying to maintain the originally established equality of political rights and justice in terms of common property.

So, we can see here a different direction in political theory and philosophy of law, as evidenced in Augustine's vision vs. the one portrayed by Raphael: Augustine's is a vertical relation between *lex aeterna* (which is also *lex naturalis*) and *lex civilis*; the other is a horizontal between different versions and modes of *lex civilis*. In Augustine's political thought the political philosopher studies current and past laws, customs, mores and ideals to realise the full extent of the need to reach for what transcends human understanding both in relation to the problems of political freedom, reality and determinism, as well as to the problems of the supremacy of will and emotion in the political establishment of peace and justice.<sup>65</sup> And while the Augustinian theorist is continuously revising and modifying the current political establishment and its organisation, in Raphael's vision the political theorist confines him/herself to conserving what has been gained and maintaining the political system's stability in the passage of time.

From the above examination of Augustine's political theory, as expanded in his chief political work, *De Civitatis Dei*, it is evident that it can be seen as the ideological platform from which More embarked to criticize the secular Renaissance Humanist vision exhibited in Raphael's *Utopia*. More's political philosophy, as both his life and his other political writings show, is geared towards the vertical relation between *lex aeterna* and *lex civilis* of Augustine's vision. His total disregard for the secular King's law and command, when in conflict to the divine, testifies to More's profound belief in this vertical relation.

However, it would be interesting to see, at this point of our investigation, the extent to which Augustine's vertical relation between *lex aeterna* and *lex civilis* differs from other such prevalent vertical relations existing at the time of More, most notably the Thomistic one. This investigation has a particular interest for our topic, since, if we cannot establish that Augustine's political vision differs from the Papalist and Thomistic one found at More's time, then an association between Augustine and More would *ipso facto* mean an association between More's and Thomas Aquinas' political ideas.<sup>66</sup> This according to the preferred interpretation that is put forward here cannot be so, and we need to spell out in more detail why.

Herbert A. Deane commenting on the "most important and enduring" influence of Augustine on medieval political thought notes with emphasis that this influence

<sup>64</sup> *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 21: "For if the people at one time were right in obeying, and then again at another time were right in not obeying, this phenomenon, or vicissitude of time, must have been derived from what is eternal in order to be just; because it is always just to obey seriously minded people, and to disobey light-minded people. Since this (*lex naturalis*) is the one law from which all temporal laws to rule man proceed in their variety..."; also *ibid.*, XIX, 12 f; XIX, 16 f; XIX, 17; XIX, 14. See also *Epistola* 105, II, 27 (in Migne, ed., *Patrologiae Latina*, vol.44).

<sup>65</sup> See Spencer 1931, esp. pp.469-479.

<sup>66</sup> A direct association between More and Thomas Aquinas was rejected on the grounds expressed by Logan 1983, pp.249-253, and discussed above.



“stems from a misinterpretation of his teaching”.<sup>67</sup> According to Deane Augustine’s political vision has been interpreted by defenders of the Papal supremacy over the State<sup>68</sup> to mean that the Pope (as the head of the Church and the head vicar of Christ) is the true *de jure* sovereign and thus, he is only one who can delegate to kings the exercise of temporal political authority. Deane believes that this theocratic interpretation of Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* could not be further from the truth: he cites two directions in Augustine’s political thought that go against Aquinas’ political theory (and misappropriation of Augustine’s position). The first has to do with Augustine’s conviction that politics can only be an imperfect theoretical system of values, because it always comes about as a necessary consequence of human sinfulness. The second is related to Augustine’s equally strong conviction that political coercion in the form of state authority and power is inevitably limited in what it can achieve and that it eventually leads to chaos and destruction.<sup>69</sup> The Thomistic view of politics and state authority was strongly influenced by the Aristotelian view of *polis* and its primary goal of promoting the good life in this world and produce good and virtuous men. Augustine did not share this Aristotelian view of polis and saw the reality of polis in far too pessimistic terms to allow a union of the two cities (of God and of people) in the form envisaged by the supporters of absolute Papal authority (including Thomas Aquinas). Deane discusses in detail two issues of great importance for this differentiation between Augustine and Thomism: the first is concerning a famous passage in the *De Civitate Dei* that makes a comparison between kingdoms and great robber bands<sup>70</sup>, and the other is concerning many other passages in the same book<sup>71</sup> that emphasise that the Church, as it exists on earth, is not by any means to be considered as the City of God or the Church in Heaven. Let us see these two issues more carefully.

Augustine’s first position (that kingdoms as they exist in reality are not very far from great robber bands) is that Christians (while alive on this earth) can only pray that they are fortunate enough to have as their rulers men with the fear of God. However, Augustine actually finds that it is in the nature of political states to allow a quite different political reality. Kingdoms are nothing else but social pacts (*pactum societatis*) among robber bands; these social pacts have as their ultimate reality not the removal of the covetousness (*cupiditas*), which initially provided their *raison d’etre*, but the addition of impunity (*impunitas*), with which they consolidate their authority and power over their subjects and their enemies.<sup>72</sup> So, it is clear that Augustine distrusted political authority and he was against any attempt to allow earthly kingdoms as they operate and exist on earth to be associated in any way to the truly just and virtuous Kingdom of the City of God.

<sup>67</sup> Deane 1963, p.232. Dyson 2001 agrees with Deane 1963 and makes more or less the same points in pp.179-191.

<sup>68</sup> Deane cites Egidius Romanus (and his work *De ecclesiastica potestate*); see Deane 1963, p.232 and end-note 25, in p.332.

<sup>69</sup> Deane 1963, p. 233.

<sup>70</sup> *De Civitate Dei*, Book IV, Chapter 4, 4.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, XX, 9. Also see XI, 12; XXI, 15; XX, 7; I, 35.

<sup>72</sup> Deane 1963, pp.126-130. See also Deane 1973, pp.424-5.

In Augustine's second position, we see that even the Pope and the entire Church, as it exists on this earth, should not be allowed to be the judges of who can be a King, and thus lead the grand robber band into ultimate salvation. In his opposition to the Donatist heresy, Augustine makes it clear that no believer in Christ "can be sure that he –or anyone else- is saved and that he will persist in his salvation till his death".<sup>73</sup> Augustine's conviction on this issue is so strong that makes him repeat his claim many times and in many different forms through out the Augustinian corpus. In *De Civitatis Dei*, he mentions the fact that 'in this world, as in a sea, both [wicked and good] swim enclosed without distinction in the net [of the Church], until it is brought ashore, when the wicked must be separated from the good, that in the good, as in His temple, God may be all in all'.<sup>74</sup> So, we also see very clearly that Augustine's second position does not allow for anyone claiming to be a Christian (including a Pope) to judge who is saved and who is not, and who can lead others to salvation or not. The Church on this earth is not the Church of the Saved, Saints and Virtuous, and the Thomists, according to Augustine, are wrong in claiming that a Pope can have state authority and political power or that he can have any jurisdiction in appointing or selecting kings. Allowing for the Pope to have state authority and political power would make him a chief in a band of robbers, and thus, we should call the Church that he leads not a Church of God, but a Church of robbers; on the other hand, the Pope cannot select nor appoint any sovereign nor a King on this earth, because no one alive can claim that he –or anyone else- is saved.

From the above short reference to Augustine's serious misinterpretation by the Papist Thomists, it is clear that Augustine can in no way be associated to Thomas Aquinas in issues related to political affairs and the relation of the State to the Church. Thus, our association of More's political theory to Augustine's vertical relation between *lex aeterna* and *lex civilis* does not harm our previously established disassociation of More from the Christian Humanists and Thomists of his age.

More's political theory has nothing to do with his contemporary state of affairs in the Church: he was neither with the Christian Renaissance Humanists nor with the Papist Thomists. His vision was both an external and an internal critique of the Church of Rome: His irony and self-mocking style attack the hypocrisy and false pretence of the clergy of the time. His Augustinianism led him to see that the Church of his time was far from the dictates of true Augustinianism.<sup>75</sup> But he did not want to break ties with tradition; only to fundamentally revise its internal priorities and aims on a political idealist basis.

#### 4. Byzantine *harmonia* or *symfonia*: an improvement on St Augustine and More?

Two key ideas regarding the Church-State relations exist in the Byzantine world, which has as its centre Constantinople for the most part of the more than a millennium existence

<sup>73</sup> Deane 1963, p.35.

<sup>74</sup> *De Civitatis Dei*, XVIII, 49.

<sup>75</sup> It is important to have in mind that Thomas More lectured on *De Civitatis Dei* and discussed extensively the contents of this work. See more on this in Kenny 1993, p. 214, Kautsky 1959, p.89.

of Byzantine Empire (330-1453). The first comes from Hosius of Corduba (c. 256–359), who was one of the key defenders of Orthodox faith at the First Council of Nicaea and a prominent advocate for Homoousion Trinitarian Theology in the Arian controversy. In a letter he wrote to the son of Constantine the Great (c. 272 – 337), Constantius II (Emperor from 337 to 361), Hosios of Cordoba wrote the following: “Μή τίθει σεαυτὸν εἰς τὰ Ἐκκλησιαστικά, μηδὲ σὺ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν παρακελεύου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρ’ ἡμῶν σὺ μάθανε ταῦτα. Σοὶ βασιλείαν ὁ Θεὸς ἐνεχείρισεν, ἡμῖν τὰ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἐπίστευσε. Καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποκλέπτων ἀντιλέγει τῷ διαταξαμένῳ Θεῷ, οὕτω φοβήθητι μὴ καὶ σὺ τὰ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἔλκων, ὑπεύθυνος ἐγκλήματι μεγάλῳ γένῃ. Ἀπόδοτε, γέγραπται, τὰ Καίσαρος Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ Θεῷ. Οὔτε τοίνυν ἡμῖν ἄρχειν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔξεστιν, οὔτε σὺ τοῦ θυμῶν ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις, βασιλεῦ”<sup>76</sup> (my translation: do not put yourself as a ruler in matters of the Church, and do not order us regarding these affairs, but try more to learn from us. God gave you a kingdom, and He entrusted us with the affairs of the Church. And as whoever steals from you your dominion, he goes against the order of God, in the same way, have fear that you will be responsible for a great crime against God, by interfering with the affairs of the Church. Because, as it is written, give the things that belong to Caesar to Caesar and the things that belong to God to God. It is not possible for us to rule over things related to this earthly world, and you, King, do not have authority and power to offer worship to God”. Further, support for this key idea of separation of the two realms comes in the writings of St John the Damascene, who in his defence of the use of the icons in worship, he writes against any attempt by the kings and emperors to interfere with the Church: “Οὐ βασιλέων ἐστὶ νομοθετεῖν τῇ Ἐκκλησίᾳ... Βασιλέων ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ εὐπραξία· ἡ δὲ ἐκκλησιαστικὴ κατάστασις ποιμένων καὶ διδασκάλων”<sup>77</sup> (my translation: It is not up to the kings to put laws for the Church... To kings it is suited to run things smoothly in matters of the state. The running of the things related to the Church is suited to the Church shepherds and teachers). In another place in his writings he stresses: “Οὐ δέχομαι βασιλέα τυραννικῶς τὴν ἱερωσύνην ἀρπάζοντα... οὐ πείθομαι βασιλικοῖς κανόσι διατάττεσθαι τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν, ἀλλὰ πατρικαῖς παραδόσεσι ἐγγράφοις τε καὶ ἀγράφοις”<sup>78</sup> (my translation: I do not accept the king trying to usurp things related to the clergy... And I will not obey orders made by kings that relate to the Church, but I will obey the written and unwritten testimony of my father-given traditions).<sup>79</sup> In a similar way, St Ambrose of Milan excommunicated Theodosius I (the Great, who ruled as an Emperor from 379 to 395) for the massacre of 7,000 people at Thessalonica in 390, after the murder of the Empire officials there by rioters. Ambrose told Theodosius to imitate David in his repentance and he readmitted the emperor to the Church and the

<sup>76</sup> As preserved by St Athanasius the Great, in M. Αθανάσιος, *Ἱστορία Ἀρειανῶν* 44, PG 25, 744-748.

<sup>77</sup> I. Δαμασκηνού, *Περὶ τῶν ἁγίων εἰκόνων* 12, PG 94, 1296.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 16, PG 94, 1301-1304.

<sup>79</sup> Note that Eusebius of Caesarea had expressed views in favour of caesaropapism earlier which were undoubtedly in the mind of St John Damascene here. For Eusebius see D. Geanakoplos, 1965, p. 385 (note however, that most of the Greek scholarship on Eusebius considers him as based on wrongly interpreted sources, see Φειδᾶς 1997a and 1997b).



Eucharist only after eight months of penance.<sup>80</sup> In an adverse development, St John Chrysostom (c.349-407) was exiled by Empress Eudoxia and Emperor Arcadius (who ruled as an Emperor from 395 to 408) due to his severe criticism against them.

However, this complete separation of powers (divine-ecclesiastical vs. worldly-royal) in later years was transformed into a *synallelia* (συναλληλία), *symfonia* (συμφωνία or symphony) or *harmonia* (αρμονία or harmony).<sup>81</sup> One of the first places where this key idea is mentioned is in the prolific builder and lawmaker Emperor Justinian's (527-565) famous novella (ΣΤ' *Νεαρά*, 535) that established this Byzantine form of *synallelia* (συναλληλία). With this system both institutions (political and ecclesiastical) were completely autonomous and respected, and the Canonical law of the Church was superior to state law in terms of interior affairs of the Church: "Μέγιστα ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ δῶρα Θεοῦ παρά τῆς ἄνωθεν δεδομένα φιλανθρωπίας Ἰερωσύνη τε καὶ Βασιλεία, ἡ μὲν τοῖς θείοις ὑπηρετουμένη, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐξάρχουσα τε καὶ ἐπιμελομένη, καὶ ἐκ μιᾶς τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκατέρα προῖοῦσα, καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον κατακοσμοῦσα βίον. Ὅστε οὐδὲν οὕτως ἂν εἴη περισπούδαστον βασιλεῦσιν ὥς ἡ τῶν ἱερέων σεμνότης, εἶγε καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἀεὶ τὸν Θεὸν ἱκετεύουσιν. Εἰ γάρ ἡ μὲν ἄμεμπτος εἴη πανταχόθεν καὶ τῆς πρὸς Θεὸν μετέχῃ παρρησίας, ἡ δὲ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ προσηκόντως κατακοσμοῖ τὴν παραδοθεῖσαν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν, ἔσται *συμφωνία τις ἀγαθή*, πᾶν εἴ τι χρηστὸν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ χαριζομένη γένοιτο... Καλῶς δὲ ἂν ἅπαντα πράττειτο καὶ προσηκόντως, εἴπερ ἡ τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχὴ γένοιτο πρέπουσα καὶ φίλη Θεῷ. Τοῦτο δὲ ἔσσεσθαι πιστεύομεν, εἴπερ ἡ τῶν ἱερῶν κανόνων παρατήρησις φυλάττειτο, ἣν οἱ τε δικαίως ὑμνούμενοι καὶ προσκυνητοὶ καὶ αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρεταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου παραδεδώκασιν Ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ ἅγιοι Πατέρες ἐφύλαξαν τε καὶ ὑφηγήσαντο..."<sup>82</sup> (my translation: The greatest blessings that God gave as gifts to humans through his mercy are two: the priesthood and the imperial authority. The priesthood ministers to the things divine; the imperial authority rules over, and shows diligence, in things human; but both proceed from the same source, and both adorn the life of humans. So, that the kings cannot be pre-occupied with decency so much as the priests, who also ask for the mercy of God upon the kings. Because if the priests are holy and solemn have a free audience with God and if the king adorns and looks after the state that God has provided there is *a good symphony* that provides all good things to the human race. And all civic rule that looks after the good and dutiful for each one of its affairs becomes appropriate and God likes it. And this is what we believe because this is what the Apostles and the Fathers of the Church kept and told us).

Of course, there were exceptional times when there were attempts to mix the two powers by not following the *synallelia* or *symfonia* conditions, set out by Justinian. We have for example the case of Emperor Leo III (717-741), who in his attempt to end the turmoil regarding the civil war on the use of icons in worship pronounced "*Βασιλεὺς εἰμὶ καὶ Ἱερεύς*" (I am the King and the Priest), but examples such as this one in Byzantine Empire were rare. The final confirmation of *synallelia* or *symphony* by the learned lexicographer and philosopher Ecumenical Patriarch Photius the Great (858-867, 877-

<sup>80</sup> As preserved by St Symeon the Translator (Metafrastes) in PG 116, 873AB.

<sup>81</sup> See Πρωτοπρεσβυτέρου Θεοδώρου Ζήση 2006, σελ. 15-30.

<sup>82</sup> Φειδᾶ 1997α, σελ. 143-155, 218-236.



886), finalised the formation of this relationship with specific canons that became soon established laws of the Empire; strict rules were imposed that all Emperors and Patriarchs should observe: the Patriarch and the clergy regained absolute control of all issues of faith and ecclesiastical affairs and the Emperor is bound by the faith declared by the Patriarch and the Orthodox Church. In these canons (“Τίτλων” Β’ and Γ’ of “Επαναγωγῆς” ἢ “Εἰσαγωγῆς τοῦ νόμον”), the Emperor becomes “ἔννομος ἐπιστάσις”, i.e., the Emperor is a custodian or caretaker bound by the canons of the Church and the rule of law, and the Patriarch is “εἰκὼν ζῶσα Χριστοῦ καὶ ἔμψυχος, δι’ ἔργων καὶ λόγων χαρακτηρίζουσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν” (i.e., a living icon of Christ, which exemplifies the truth through his actions and words).<sup>83</sup>

So, even though at specific and isolated times in Byzantine Empire there were breaks with the *synallelia*, *symfonia*, *harmonia* tradition, overall this relationship, this *modus vivendi* between Church and the State, was observed.<sup>84</sup>

What can we observe in relation to St Augustine and Thomas More with this short discussion of how the relationship between the state and ecclesiastical power and authority developed in Byzantine Empire? One can see an evolution and development of the Augustinian thinking on this relationship that is quite unique in European history and civilisation. In Western Europe we have, from the time of the Edict of Milan (which was a political agreement between the Roman emperors Constantine I and Licinius in February 313, which for the first time established religious toleration for Christianity within the Roman Empire) a separation of the two powers (ecclesiastical and state) and a continuous struggle from the one to overtake the other; key examples of this struggle we have in the Papoceansarism of Pope Nicholas I (858-867) in Rome, who claimed that, because ultimately all power comes from God, he, as the successor of Peter, should also have political power (a position that attracted fierce criticism from the other Christian hierarchs, because it goes against the 81 and 83 Apostolic Canons and the 7<sup>th</sup> Canon of the Fourth Ecumenical Council), and the Caesaropapism of Henry VIII of England (1491-1547), who became the head of the Church of England due to his disagreement with the Pope over the dissolution of his wedding. In the East, we have the Byzantine *synallelia*, *symfonia* and *harmonia* that was achieved for the largest parts of the more than 1000 years existence of Byzantine Empire and was expressed in its most finalised form in the writings of St. Photius the Great.

Note that this *synallelia* or *symfonia* would satisfy both St Augustine and More in the most preferred readings of their texts. For St Augustine, the final formulation of St Photius makes it imperative for the Emperor to obey the canons, rules and dogma of the Church. This agrees with St Augustine’s view that the wordly kingdom is established on the basis of a pact between unlawful and sinful humans, and thus, it should reach out for its salvation towards the Church (note that St Augustine here is against Thom-

<sup>83</sup> Φειδᾶ, 1997β, I, σελ. 777 κέξ and Φειδᾶ, 1980. Note that these expressions are found continuously in later texts; see Isidoros Pilousiotis in ‘Επιστολῶν βιβλίον Δ’, ἀρ. 143 (J.-P. Migne, PG, τόμ. 78, στ. 976b και 1224c).

<sup>84</sup> Πρωτοπρεσβυτέρου Γεωργίου Μεταλληνού, 1977; Baynes and Moss (ed.), 1948. Note for the use of *harmonia*, which was in wide use near the time of Photius, no one dared openly confirm any meaning other than the one proposed by Photius’ final formulation of the Church- State relationship. See Maguire 2004, pp.158-161.

as Aquinas and Papocaesarism). It also would agree with the views of More on the issue of the primacy of the Church (but not Papism) and religious faith having a priority over the dictates of the King.

## 5. Conclusions

In the above discussion, I first critically discussed the republican interpretation of More's *Utopia*, focusing on the specific problem of the relation of religion to the state. With the help of both stylistic and philosophical argument analysis of the theory presented in More's work, I concluded that the republican approach is mistaken regarding both the intentions and the direction of a work written by a political philosopher, who was neither a republican, nor a libertarian. More's pre-occupation with tradition, as well as his mockery of the republican and libertarian vision of the main character (Raphael Hythloday), testifies to More's belief that the republican and libertarian approach into politics is a complete failure. I then pursued an investigation into the ideological foundations of More's political thinking via a short parallelism with Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, and I found that this Augustinian work (in its preferred reading) is indeed helpful in making us understand the true intentions of More's work. Even though More mocked both the secular as well as the Christian Humanist movements of his time, he was also critical of the papist establishment and papist ideology (as evidenced in Papocaesarism and Thomism). His vision was closer to the revisionist Augustinianism with which he was acquainted from his youth, and it is this kind of political idealism and realism that can help us comprehend more correctly the intentions as well as the aims of More's *Utopia*. Finally, after investigating briefly the development of Byzantine *synallelia*, *symfonia* and *harmonia*, with its final formulation in St Photius the Great, we see an option that both More and St Augustine (in their preferred readings) would find attractive. This final point guarantees that the philosophical and political thought of both St Augustine and More is not so utopian, but a realistic prospect of Church- State relations and in large extent successful, as evidenced in the political reality of the more than 1000 years existence of Byzantine Empire.<sup>85</sup>

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### Константин Атанасопулос

#### Религија и држава у Муровој *Υῤῥωῦν*: преиспитивање републиканства и византијска *synallelia*, *symfonia* и *harmonia*

*Сажећак:* Након испитивања републиканских vs. нерепубликанских тумачења Муровог дела, усредсређујем се на тумачење које је надахнуто Августином. Рад завршавам извесним побољшањима августиновског модела односа између Цркве и државе које су понудили византијски цареви и патријарси. Сутеришем да византијска побољшања о којима је реч нуде стабилнији и мање проблематичан однос.

*Кључне речи:* Мур, Августин, Јустинијан, Фотије, Лав III, *synallelia*, *symfonia*, *harmonia*